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Introduction
Foreign businessmen have attempted to sell their goods in the United States
for less than the price they command in their country of origin for many years. I
That is not to say that American entrepreneurs have been unwilling to resort
to such practices-disdainfully referred to as "dumping"-in order to market
their goods in foreign countries.2 The ethic in international trade has been: "I
export, he dumps." 3
The laws of the United States treat dumping as either a price discrimination
prohibited by antitrust statutes 4 or as a violation of tariff laws subjecting the
violator to special import duties.I These statutes have become especially signif-
icant as American businessmen look with unprecedented frequency to increased
sales of domestic goods in foreign markets. 6 The success of American exports
augurs stiffer competition from foreign competitors. This heightened com-
* B.A. California State University, Northridge and University of Uppsala, Sweden 1972; J.D.,
University of San Francisco School of Law 1976; Candidate for L.L.M., London School of
Economics and Political Science 1977.
'See generally J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1966 ed.) [herein-
after cited as VINER].
'Canada enacted the first antidumping law in 1904. The statute was apparently directed at the
practices of American international traders as well as other members of the international
community. See CAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-15, codifying Antidumping Act, 1968-1969, c. 10 § 1 (1970)
(current antidumping law which imposes extra import duties on violators).
'Marks, United States Antidumping Laws-A Government Overview, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 580,
587 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Marks], quoting THE EONOMIST.
'Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970)). Other
antitrust statutes are also applicable: (1) Sherman Act sections 1 and 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1970);
(2) the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1970); and (3) the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1970). On the applicable provisions of the Clayton Act, see text accompanying notes 78-97 infra.
'Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1970), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 160-71
(1975).
'TIME, April 5, 1976, at 71. The government statistics for the 1975 "basic" balance of payments
(current transactions plus long term capital movements) indicate a surplus for the first time since
these figures have been recorded, i.e., the past 14 years. The primary reason for the surplus was
higher sales of American goods abroad as a result of previous dollar devaluations.
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petition is likely to be stiffest in the United States where foreign manufacturers
compete with domestic producers for American consumers' dollars.7 Anti-
dumping laws are designed to regulate the pricing practices used in waging this
kind of economic warfare.'
Unprecedented legal activity has taken place concerning dumping practices.
A federal district court judge has upheld a nearly-forgotten sixty-year-old statute9
which forbids dumping as an antitrust violation and provides injurer American
businessmen and their attorneys with the tantalizing prospect of treble
damages. '0 By enacting the Federal Trade Act of 1974,11 Congress has provided
for more aggressive governmental controls on importers who dump goods on
domestic markets. " Lawyers have speculated on the likely effects of these
developments at a legal seminar 3 and in a special report on dumping. 14
This article will consider the resurrection of the sixty-year-old United States
predatory dumping law15 as well as the ruling that the Robinson-Patman price
discrimination law' 6 is inapplicable to dumping practices.' 7 After comparing
the Robinson-Patman Act 8 with the Predatory Dumping Act, 19 the elements
needed to establish an antitrust dumping violation will be described and
analyzed. 2 0
I. The Resurrection of the Predatory Dumping Act of 1916
A. Historical Perspective
As the conclusion of the First World War neared, American businessmen
'Government balance of trade figures for the first quarter of 1976 demonstrate a reversal of the
1975 surplus. United States merchandise imports exceeded exports by $1.5 billion during the three-
month period, which is a major shift from the $2.2 billion export surplus for the last quarter of
1975. Moczar, U.S. International Transactions: First Quarter 1976. U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE SUR-
VEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, June, 1976, at 29.
'See VINER, supra note 1, chs. 3-5.
'15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
"OZenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
"Federal Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2043.
"Id. at § 321(a)-(e), codified at 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 160-170a (1975).
"Meeting of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association, recorded in 43
ANTITRUST L.J. 505-651 (1975).
'ABA ANTITRUST SECTION AD Hoc COMM. ON ANTITRUST AND ANTIDuMPING, REPORT OF THE
AD Hoc SuBcoMM. ON ANITRusT AND ANTIDUMPING (1973), appended to 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 653
(1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
1515 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
"615 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
"Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
"Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
"15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970). The term "Predatory Dumping Act" is utilized in this article in order to
distinguish the 1916 Act from the 1921 Act, which is commonly known as the "Antidumping Act of
1921." The term "Predatory Dumping Act" also emphasizes that the 1916 Act is an antitrust law as
opposed to the 1921 Act, which is a tariff law. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1970), as amended, 19
U.S.C.A. §§ 160-71 (1975).
"Although the provisions of the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act are applicable to the
typical dumping case, this article is concerned with the unknown ramifications of the Predatory
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became apprehensive that their newly established economic stature would be
quickly eroded by inexpensive foreign goods deluging American markets.21
Congress responded to these fears by enacting section 801 of the Revenue Act of
191622 which prohibited the predatory sale of goods in the United States at
dumping prices. 3
The United States was not the first country to enact such a statute, nor was it
the last.25 In 1921 the United States added to its antidumping laws, and later it
became a signatory to an international agreement concerning dumping. This
agreement was the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade which contained
provisions outlawing dumping practices. 26 This treaty ultimately spawned the
Antidumping Code of 1968.27 However, due to the cautious approach taken by
Congress in ratifying these treaties, domestic laws control dumping in the
United States. 2
Despite this considerable legislative activity, enforcement of the laws has
hardly been inspirational over the last sixty years. While administrative actions
taken pursuant to the 1921 Act have increased recently,2 9 a remarkable lack of
attention has been afforded the Predatory Dumping Act.
B. Early Development of the Law
1. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The Predatory Dumping Act of 191630 was enacted as a penal and an anti-
trust law. The entire wording of the statute is complicated and difficult to
interpret. 3 In pertinent part it provides:
Dumping Act. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 244, 251
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
"ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 658.
"Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970)) (hereinafter
referred to as the Predatory Dumping Act).
"See text accompanying notes 30-37 infra.
"See note 2 supra.
"During the 1930s, twenty-five countries enacted antidumping legislation. See Marks, supra note
3, at 586: Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-the United States and the
International Dumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 493-94 (1972).
"General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. VI (1), T.I.A.S. No. 1890, as
modified, 62 Stat. 3682, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (effective Jan. 1, 1948).
"Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade,
opened for signature June 30, 1967 [1967]. T.I.A.S. No. 6431, 19 U.S.T. 4348 (effective July 1,
1968).
"'The International Antidumping Code is inapplicable in the United States to the extent that it is
inconsistent with United States law or restricts the authority of the former Tariff Commission.
Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, § 201(a)(1), 82 Stat. 1347, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970). See
Applebaum, United States Antidumping Laws-Impact on the Competitive Process, 43 ANTITRUST
L.J. 590, 594 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Applebaum]; Marks, supra note 3, at 587.
"In 1973, the government took 42 actions to enforce antidumping provisions of the 1921 Act. See
note 5 supra. this reflected a large increase in government enforcement, as in 1968 only 16 such
actions were taken. Marks, supra note 3, at 583-84.
"Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 801, 39 Stat. 798 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970)).
"But see text accompanying notes 142-78 infra.
International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 2
230 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing any articles
from any foreign country into the United States, commonly and systematically to
import, sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles within the United States at
a price substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such
articles, at the time of exportation to the United Sates, in the principal markets of
the country of their production, or of other foreign countries to which they are
commonly exported after adding to such market value or wholesale price, freight,
duty, and other charges and expenses necessarily incident to the importation and
sale thereof in the United States: Provided, That such act or acts be done with the
intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the
establishment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing
any part of trade and commerce in such articles in the United States.
32
Persons violating this law may be criminally and civilly liable.33 Violation
constitutes a misdemeanor which can be punished by a maximum fine of $5,000
or a one-year term in prison. Inasmuch as no one has ever been convicted for
violating the statute,3" the teeth of the enforcement provisions are in the civil
remedy of treble damages for any person who is "injured in his business or
property by reason of' a violation of the statute."
Perhaps due to the prolix language in the statute itself,3 6 a general apathy
developed concerning the statute. Few cases even mention the Predatory
Dumping Act." However, of the few cases that discuss the statute, two cases
succeeded in inhibiting the development of the law.
2. JUDICIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO THE PREDATORY DUMPING LAW
The renowned Second Circuit Court of Appeals bench of the 1930s was the
only appellate court to ever rule on a suit based on the Predatory Dumping Act.
In Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 38 the court held that pre-trial discovery in suits
for a violation of section 72 is limited by the Fifth Amendment right against
3715 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
"Section 72 provides:
Any person who violates or combines or conspires with any other person to violate this section is
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
$5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of, or combination or
conspiracy to violate, this section, may sue therefore in the district court of the United States for
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has .an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages sustained, and the cost of the
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. (15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970)).
"Marks, supra note 3, at 581. Despite four attempts by the government to enforce the law, no one
has ever been convicted. Id.
"See text accompanying notes 139-40 infra.
3 Marks, supra note 3, at 582.
"There are only 7 cases in 60 years which have cited or discussed the statute: United States v.
Cooper, 312 U.S. 600,609 (1940); Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Wagner
& Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2d 666, 669-70 (2d Cir. 1935); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Hutchinson v. Barry, 50 F. Supp. 292, 297-98 (D.
Mass. 1943); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
3874 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1935) (L. Hand, Swan & Manton, JJ.).
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self-incrimination. 9 The court noted that the proof sought by the plaintiffs in
pursuing their civil remedy under the statute "may tend to incriminate the
defendants," 40 and based their decision upon the rule that "discovery will not lie
if the discovery will incriminate the defendant or subject him to penalty or
forfeitu re." 4 I
The plaintiff in Mali tried to circumvent the operation of the Fifth Amendment
by arguing that the statute of limitations on a related criminal statute 2 had
expired as to a certain portion of the material desired by discovery 43 and,
therefore, the Fifth Amendment impediment did not pertain to that evidence.
However Judge Swan, who wrote the unanimous opinion, imaginatively noted
that this earlier evidence would be a constituent part of the proof of a conspiracy
to defraud the United States.4 4 If the conspiracy were still continuing, the
statute of limitations for the conspiracy would not yet have expired and Fifth
Amendment protection would still be present. 4  Accordingly, the court
effectively foreclosed discovery4 6 of the evidence plaintiff needed to establish a
claim for treble damages under the Predatory Dumping Act. 47
Another more covert stumbling block to effective civil enforcement of the
predatory dumping law arose in the case of United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America. " In a small part of that monumental 214-page opinion, Judge Coffey
pointed out that:
[I]t was lawful for Alcoa to agree with ... foreign companies that if they (the foreign
companies) refrained from violating the Anti-Dumping Law of the United States ....
Alcoa would not be guilty of the same misconduct in their countries."
This ruling must have had a latent effect upon the subsequent enforcement of
the statute. After Alcoa, United States businessmen could contract with their
foreign counterparts not to break the Predatory Dumping Act of the United
States in exchange for a reciprocal agreement not to violate the foreign country's
antidumping statutes. 10 This expedient obviates the expense and substantial
problems in prosecuting a treble damage action under the Predatory Dumping
"Id. at 670.401d.
4 Id.
1118 U.S.C. § 186 (defrauding customs officials), superseded by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62
Stat. 683 (enacting new federal criminal code).
'18 U.S.C. § 584 (statute of limitation), superseded by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683
(enacting new federal criminal code).
"18 U.S.C. § 88, superseded by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683 (enacting new federal
criminal code).
4574 F.2d at 670.
"The court reserved the final ruling on this issue for the district court. Id. at 671. However, it
noted that the discovery sought was "extremely doubtful." Id. at 669.
"See text accompanying notes 142-78 infra.
"144 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
"Id. at 240.
IGMany commercial relationships were potentially affected by this rule. See note 25 supra.
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Act while still benefitting from the rule established by that enactment. It is
questionable whether such contracts satisfy the traditional requirement for
consideration between contracting parties since neither bargaining party suffers
a legal detriment by their promise not to violate the law."1 Nevertheless, the rule
validating such contracts made the active prosecution of treble damage claims
under the 1916 law more remote than ever before.
3. A "DEAD LETTER"
Several factors heralded the demise of the Predatory Dumping Act: (1) the
obtuseness of its statutory language;5" (2) the inability to procure evidence to
pursue the remedies offered by the Act; 3 (3) the pragmatic advantages of
agreeing not to violate it;"4 and (4) the notability of the Antidumping Act of
1921, 51 coupled with the apparent willingness of private businesses to let the
government regulate dumping under the 1921 Act. The apathy generated by
the Predatory Dumping Act over sixty years made legal authorities label the
statute a "dead letter. ' ' 6 However, recent developments have proven these
authorities wrong, as the Act is very much alive in the district court of
Pennsylvania.
C. The Zenith Decision
In 1970 an American electronics firm, National Union Electric Corporation,
brought an action in the federal district court in New Jersey against a large
portion of the Japanese electronics industry 7 for various unfair trade practices
including violations of the Predatory Dumping Act. 8 Subsequently, Zenith
Radio Corporation sued most of the same defendants and others 9 on essentially
the same legal theories in the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania. 6 The
"See IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 171-92 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 76A (Tent. Drafts 1-7, 1974).
"Marks, supra note 3, at 582; ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 660.
"Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2d 666, 669-70 (2d Cir. 1935).
"United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
"The Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71 (1970), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A.
§§ 160-70a (1975).
"Prosterman, Withholding ofAppraisement Under the United States Antidumping Act: Protec-
tionism or Unfair Competition Law?, 41 WASH. L. REV. 315, 316 n.4 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Prosterman]; Marks, supra note 3, at 581.
"Among the defendants sued by National Union Electric Corporation are: Hitachi Sales Cor-
poration of America, Matsushita Electric Corporation of America, Matsushita Electric Industrial
Company, Ltd., Mitsubishi International Corporation, Sanyo Electric, Inc., SONY Corporation,
SONY Corporation of America, Sharp Electronics Corporation, and Toshiba America, Inc.
saNational Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., Civil Action No. 1706-70
(D.N.J. filed Dec. 21, 1970).
"Among the defendants sued by Zenith Radio Corporation are: Hitachi, Ltd., Hitachi Kaden
Hanbai Kabushiki Kaisha, Mitsubishi Corporation, Quasar Electronics Corporation, Sanyo
Electric Trading Co., Ltd., Sharp Corporation, Tokyo Shibaura Electric Company, Ltd.
"'Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., Civil Action No. 74-3247 (E.D. Pa.
filed Sept. 20, 1974).
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Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the two actions for
pretrial proceedings before the Pennsylvania court.6 That court became the
scene for defendants' attack upon the Predatory Dumping Act as an unconstitu-
tionally overbroad statute.
In an acerbic opinion, 6 Judge Higginbotham ruled that the statute was not
unconstitutionally overbroad. The court made common sense 63 and standard
business concepts 64 its touchstones in interpreting the statute for the first time
since its enactment. Refusing to see the words in the Act as "cabalistic signs ' 61
Judge Higginbotham relied upon standard dictionary definitions in discussing
the statute. 66
The opinion focused specifically upon troublesome phrases in the Act and
honed the terminology into understandable concepts. The statute requires
violators to "commonly and systematically" dump their goods in United States
markets, which the court interpreted to mean dumping activities of consider-
able frequency, performed as a matter of general practice and regularly done in a
recurring pattern. 67 Thus, the number of acts, the time span in which the acts
occurred, and the similarity between the acts all seem to be important elements in
determining whether the violator "commonly and systematically" dumped
goods. 68
The requirement that the price of the goods in. the United States be
"substantially less" than their price in their home country or other usual
foreign market was interpreted by the court to be no more than a typical
antitrust standard. 69 The court compared the predatory dumping statute to the
Robinson-Patman Act and concluded:
Certainly, the calculation of a substantial price differential is no more difficult, and is
likely to be far easier than the calculation of a substantial lessening of competition. 7 0
The court's observation implies that a violation of the Predatory Dumping Act
"In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 388 F. Supp. 565 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975);
see 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
62402 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa. 1975). At one point in his opinion, Judge Higginbotham sardonical-
ly notes that the Predatory Dumping Act "is not, as Winston Churchill once said of Russia and as
defendants seem to suggest, 'a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside of an enigma."' Id. at 256. In
concluding his opinion, the Judge states that he has "witnessed at close range a Dionysian intoxica-
tion with the creation of intellectual chaos and confusion where none need exist." Id. at 262.
Likening the defense counsel to "the Lamont Cranstons of our common profession, that is, lawyers







"For a more detailed explanation of the behavior proscribed by the Predatory Dumping Act, see
text accompanying notes 149-56 infra.
"1402 F. Supp. at 256; see text accompanying notes 124-27 infra.
"Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
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may be far easier to prove than a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act and
should help to make many more antitrust attorneys interested in the statute. In
addition, the parallel drawn between the Predatory Dumping Act and the basic
price discrimination law in the United States, section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act," provides lawyers with an established set of legal guidelines with
which to interpret the Predatory Dumping Act.72
The court provided more assistance in delineating the statute by holding out
tariff legislation and decisions of the Court of Customs Appeals as appropriate
measures of the "actual market or wholesale value" of the dumped goods in
their home country or common foreign market.73 This term may also be defined
under the law as it is used in the common lexicon of businessmen.'
Its interpretation of the term "dumping" is characteristic of the district
court's approach to the Predatory Dumping Act. The court refused to fall prey
to a stilted, super-legalistic interpretation of the statute, and thereby has given
attorneys a necessary foothold in utilizing the Act in future private treble
damage actions. It has accomplished this result by emphasizing that "the
phenomenon described by the 1916 Act has a meaningful referent in business
usage and practice."' 5 The court approvingly quoted a simple definition of
dumping devised by a leading authority in the field: "[Dumping is] price
discrimination between different purchasers in different national markets."17 6
The court found that elaboration of the term could be obtained from the
perpetrators and victims of dumping-the businessmen dealing in international
trade. The court reasoned:
An economic regulatory statute could scarcely acquire the designation of an "anti-
dumping" act unless the business community to which the statute was addressed knew
what "dumping" was."
By allowing its statutory interpretation to be based upon everyday business
practices in international trade, the court effectively rescued the Predatory
Dumping Act from de facto extinction.
115 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). The Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, is
referred to herein by its latter designation.
"See, e.g., F. RoWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1962, Supp.
1964); C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PAT-
MAN ACT (2d ed. 1959); C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW (1959). All of these sources
provide fairly exhaustive discussions of the case law and secondary literature on the Robinson-Pat-
man Act.
"1402 F. Supp. at 257.
7Id. The court discussed the phrase, "other charges and expenses necessarily incident to the
importation and sale," and ruled that the meaning of the words "can be ascertained by a simple
analogy with 'freight' and 'duty."' Id. at 258.
"Id. at 258-59.
7Id. at 259, quoting VINER, supra note 1, at 4.
"402 F. Supp. at 259.
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II. The Robinson-Patman Act Excluded from Dumping Cases
A. The Problem of Applying the
Robinson-Patman Act to Dumping
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act78 prohibits any person engaged in
commerce from directly or indirectly discriminating in the price of its goods sold
to different consumers. Inasmuch as section 1 of the Act defines "commerce" to
include both interstate and foreign commerce, it appears that the dumping of
goods by foreign competitors within the domestic markets of the United States
could be actionable under section 2(a). 79
Section 2(a) qualifies its prohibition to commodities in commerce "where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption or resale within the United
States."80 It is clear that the goods sold within the United States at a price below
their actual market value in the foreign country fall within the purview of the
statute as the first "leg" of the price discrimination under section 2(a).
However, a question arises as to whether the commodities sold in a foreign
country qualify under section 2(a) as the second "leg" of the price
discrimination: Do both of the sales have to occur within the United States in
order to apply section 2(a)?
The resolution of this question in favor of applying section 2(a) of the Act to
predatory dumping cases is supported by legislative history and the coverage
given to associated subsections of the statute. First, when the price
discrimination law was amended in 1936,81 language incorporated by the
Senate82 which would have clearly limited the scope of section 2(a) to domestic
goods was removed by joint action of the House and Senate.83 This
congressional action concerned what commodities would be covered by the Act.
It may have also implicitly included which transactions would be covered by the
Act. 84 Under this reasoning, Congress sanctioned application of section 2(a) to
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
7"15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
8015 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
"Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970)). Actually,
it was this amendment that caused this portion of the Clayton Act to be known as the Robinson-
Patman Act.
"The Senate bill was passed by the Senate on April 30, 1936, and limited the Act's scope to goods
"manufactured or produced" and sold for use, consumption or resale within the United States. See
F. RowE, PRICE DIsCRIMINATION ACT UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 83 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as RowE].
"80 Cong. Rec. 6436 (1936); H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936).
"Before the 1936 amendment, the statute had applied to sales by foreign cartels in the United
States. United States v. Deutsches Kalissyndikat Gesellschaft, 2 Decrees and Judgments in Civil
Federal Antitrust Cases 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); United States v. N.V. Amsterdamsche Chinine-
fabriels, 2 Decrees and Judgments in Civil Federal Antitrust Cases 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
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dumping practices wherein one "leg" of the discrimination is outside the United
States. 81
Second, subsection (c) of section 2 has been applied to international trade
when American businessmen arrange for illicit commissions or brokerage fees
on sales of goods to foreign buyers.8 6 Subsection (c) does not contain the
limiting language of 2(a) concerning "use, consumption, or resale within the
United States" and, therefore, the analogy between 2(a) and subsection (c) is
limited. Nevertheless, the application of subsection (c) to foreign trade is not
merely an aberration within the Robinson-Patman Act"' and may indicate the
extension of section 2(a) to dumping practices.88
B. Robinson-Patman Act Not Applicable to Dumping
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., 89 the
district court dismissed the Robinson-Patman Act cause of action under section
2(a). The court studied the ambiguous statutory language and decided that:
[T]he requirement of "use, consumption, or resale within the United States" modifies
and limits the more general "in commerce" provision upon which plaintiffs primarily
rely.10
The court looked to the time of the initial enactment of section 2(a) in 1914
and decided the case upon Congress's world view during that era.9 In addition,
the court's limitation of section 2(a) was supported by the fact that antidumping
laws were enacted after section 2(a) 91 and while section 2(a) was on the books
administrative statements had been made that legislation outlawing dumping
was needed. 'I
The determinative factor in the court's ruling appeared to be that the plaintiff
had the burden of establishing that the Act supported its theory of recovery:
The weakness in the plaintiffs position is that "nowhere in the statute, or in the
legislative history, and in no judicial decision" has there been any extension of the act
to permit it to reach the transactions alleged here. 9
"But see text accompanying note 90 infra.
'
0 Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
"Canadian Ingersoll-Rand v. D. Loveman & Sons, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 829, 833-34 n.4 (N.D.
Ohio 1964).
"Cf. RowE, supra note 82, at 82.
"1402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
"I1d. at 248; see text accompanying note 79 supra.
"Id. at 248-49. The House Judiciary Committee's report stated that "the language used makes
this section applicable only to domestic commerce, or, in other words, its application is restricted to
commerce carried on in the United States." H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1914)
(emphasis added).
92402 F. Supp. at 249; see text accompanying notes 21-29 supra.
" 402 F. Supp. at 249. See REPORT OF THE DEP'T OF COMMERCE 43 (1916); UNITED STATES
TAIFF COMM'N, REPORT ON DUMPING AND UNFAIR FOREIGN COMPETITION IN THE UNITED
STATES 18 (1919); REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY, APPEN-
DIX C at 5-6 (1968).
11402 F. Supp. at 250, quoting Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 13.
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The court noted the impact its decision would have upon the effectiveness of the
antitrust laws in combatting anticompetitive business practices in international
trade. 9 Nevertheless, it offered its reassurance that "a panoply of other
remedial statutes" 6 would offer American enterprises victimized by foreign
dumping activities the means for redress."
Since the present state of the law in import price discriminations precludes
the use of the Robinson-Patman Act, which is the best known weapon against
such activities at the domestic level, the significance of the Predatory Dumping
Act has been magnified considerably. One method of ascertaining the impact of
this unknown price discrimination statute is to contrast it with the well-developed
legal principles surrounding the Robinson-Patman Act.
I1. A Comparison of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act and the
Predatory Dumping Act
A. Similarities
1. CONDEMNATION OF INJURIOUS PRICE DISCRIMINATIONS
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discriminations
which have an anticompetitive effect upon the sale of similar goods purchased in
interstate commerce. 9 8 The Predatory Dumping Act outlaws the importation
and sale of articles in the United States at a price below their actual market
value or wholesale price in foreign markets when done to injure an industry in
the United States. 99 Both statutes are directed against the evil of differential
pricing which allows the violator to obtain an advantage over his competitor
and, to some degree, injures the latter. 100
2. PROHIBITION OF PRICE TRANSFERS
The Robinson-Patman Act was originally enacted to stop large national
merchandisers from pricing transfers which forced small, independent
competitors out of the market.101 Price transfers occur when the violator
supports low prices in district A by charging high prices in district B. While the
buyers in district A enjoy superficially low prices, the violator's small
competitors in district A, who are unable to subsidize low prices, are unable to
compete. Moreover, the buyers in district B unwittingly promote the violator's
scheme by paying high prices which permit the low district A prices.
"1402 F. Supp. at 251.
"Sherman Act §§ 1 & 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1970); Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8; Antidump-
ing Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
7402 F. Supp. at 251.
1"E.W. KITCH& H.S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 236 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as KITCH & PERLMAN].
915 U.S.C. § 72 (1970); see text accompanying notes 149-78 infra.
1°°Applebaum, supra note 28, at 598.
"1H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914); KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 98, at 235.
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Under the Predatory Dumping Act the price transfers may occur between
different countries. For example, a producer of pottery in England may charge
high prices in that country for the purpose of subsidizing the sale of pottery in
the United States at a low price.'° The Predatory Dumping Act prohibits such
an international price transfer. Thus, domestic pottery producers in the United
States are assured of fair pricing practices by their foreign competitors and are
thereby protected from predatory competitive behavior. The evils of price
transfers have been recognized by the courts in decisions under the
Robinson-Patman Act 0 3 and those same pernicious effects are prohibited in a
similar way by the predatory dumping law.' 0 4
3. DEFENSES
There are two statutory defenses to alleged violations of section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act: (1) cost justification 05 and (2) good faith meeting of
competition. 106 While one commentator has distinguished the Predatory
Dumping Act from section 2(a) on this ground, 10 7 there seems to be an implicit
recognition of these two defenses in the antidumping law's express requirement
of specific intent. 08
In establishing a predatory dumping violation, the specific intent of the
alleged violator to injure an American business must be established.10 9 Thus,
the motivation for the conduct of the violator is at issue. Exculpatory evidence
available to the alleged violator would apparently be that the lower prices
charged in the United States were due to the lower costs incurred in producing
those goods in the foreign country." 0 Such a cost justification would evidence a
"'Actually, the German coal-tar dye industry was the chief concern of legislators who enacted the
1916 law. See ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 658.
"'Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Com m'n, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961); Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269
F.2d 950, 956 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Maryland Baking Co. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 243 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1957); E.B. Muller & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 142
F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944); Puerto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d
234 (2d Cir. 1929).
'"
4Price transfers under the Predatory Dumping Act are unlawful even if there is no industry in
the discriminatory priced article in the United States. The law specifically outlaws dumping for the
purpose "of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 72
(1970).
"'15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
-'15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
"'Applebaum, supra note 28, at 598-99.
"'The Robinson-Patman Act has no specific intent requirement. Therefore, the defenses
negating improper competitive motives are stated in the Act itself. For a discussion of the specific
intent requirement in the Predatory Dumping Act, see text accompanying notes 157-78 infra.
"'See text accompanying notes 157-78 infra.
-'Cost justification defenses are very difficult to establish. One Department of Justice report on
the subject states that "only the most prosperous and patient business firm could afford pursuit of
an often illusory defense." THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N TO STUDY THE
International Lawyer, Vol. 11, No. 2
International Price Discrimination 239
non-predatory intent by the alleged violator. Similarly, proof that the price on
articles imported to the United States was set in a good faith effort to meet
competition in the United States market would contradict a finding of intent to
injure businesses within the United States."' These two defenses, explicitly
recognized in the Robinson-Patman Act,"I have the same effect as the specific
intent requirement under the Predatory Dumping Act." 3 Therefore, the
statutes are similar in the defenses afforded to alleged price discriminators.
4. STANDING AND REMEDIES
The standing requirement in suits under the Robinson-Patman Act and the
Predatory Dumping Act are similar. In both instances standing is given to those
who are injured in their "business or property by reason of any violation of' the
statutes. 114
The remedies provided by the two laws are similar. Government enforcement
actions may be taken which result in misdemeanor convictions and fines. 'I
Both laws provide for a maximum punishment of $5,000 and imprisonment for
one year, but these provisions have rarely been invoked." 6
The primary enforcement mechanism in both statutes is the remedy of treble
damages available to private parties who are successfult in civil actions. "' In
addition to the triple recovery amount, civil remedies include costs of the suit
and attorney's fees." I It is the enticement of substantial money damages which
causes many price discrimination suits to be brought and pursued to a
successful conclusion. "'
B. Differences
1. THE TARGET OF ANTICOMPETITIVE INJURY
The Predatory Dumping Act specifically outlaws those price discriminations
which are carried out for the purpose of injuring or destroying, or preventing the
establishment of, industries in the United States, or restraining or monopolizing
ANTITRUST LAWS 173. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 350 U.S. 469 (1962); Automatic
Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
"'Cf Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231 (1951) (Robinson-Patman Act
defense).
".See text accompanying notes 105-06 supra.
"'See ABA REPORT, supra note 14," at 657-61.
"'415 U.S.C. § 72 (1970). Compare Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) with 15 U.S.C. § 72
(1970). See Bywater v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 1971 Trade Cases 1 73,759 (S.D.N.Y.); ABA
REPORT, supra note 14, at 660.
'15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
" 'd. See KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 49, at 236; Marks, supra note 3, at 582.
11'15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
'"Id. The Predatory Dumping Act is also like the Robinson-Patman Act in that no minimum
amount in controversy is necessary. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970) with 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
"'See text accompanying notes 139-40 infra.
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trade in the discriminatory priced articles inside the United States. 12 0 The focus
of the Robinson-Patman Act is somewhat different. It prohibits price
discriminations in interstate commerce which injure or destroy competition, or
tend to create a monopoly, or "where the effect ... may be to substantially
lessen competition." I'I The extent to which the two provisions are different will
depend upon judicial interpretation of the Predatory Dumping Act.
However, section 2(a) is distinctly different from the dumping law because it
prohibits price discriminations which merely "tend to" lessen competition.' 2
There is no incipiency language in the Predatory Dumping Act analogous to
section 2(a). Therefore, predatory dumping antitrust violations are limited to
actual injuries and do not extend to potentially anticompetitive price
discriminations. 123
2. THE MEASURE OF ANTICOMPETITIVE INJURY
Section 2(a) prohibits "price discrimination" but the United States Supreme
Court has determined that the law reaches any "price difference" that meets the
other qualifications of illegality under the statute. 4 The Predatory Dumping
Act is less equivocal in its prohibition, as it delineates a measure for price
discrimination.121 Unlike section 2(a)'s blanket prohibition of "price
discrimination," the Predatory Dumping Act outlaws sales:
[At] a price substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale prices of such
articles ... in the principal markets of the country of their production or of other
foreign countries to which they are commonly exported after adding to such market
value or wholesale price, freight, duty, and other charges and expenses necessarily
incident to . . . importation and sale ... into the United States.
26
It is apparent from the detailed wording of the statute that the prohibition is
not applicable to a mere "price difference" but requires a more sophisticated
12015 U.S.C. § 72 (1970); see text accompanying notes 157-78 infra.
'215 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
"'15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). The statute outlaws price discrimination "where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." Id.
(emphasis added).
'"A similar discrepancy exists between the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. One well-known
authority has written:
It is usually said that the Clayton Act is more prohibitive than the Sherman Act for otherwise it
would be superfluous, and that it is designed to catch anticompetitive actions "in their incipien-
cy" before they ripen into Sherman Act violations. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANAVyss 579 (2d
ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA].
While the Predatory Dumping Act is more autonomous from the Clayton Act than the Clayton
Act is from the Sherman Act, it is less prohibitive than its domestic counterpart.
"'Federal Trade Comm'n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
12315 U.S.C. § 72 (1970); see text accompanying note 150 infra.
'2615 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
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anticompetitive act.' 27 Plaintiffs in predatory dumping cases will have a more
substantial burden in ascertaining and proving this illegal behavior than
plaintiffs in section 2(a) cases.
3. THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTES
The acts covered by section 2(a) include primary and secondary line injury.
Primary line injury occurs horizontally between the discriminating seller and his
competitors.'2 8 More common violations of section 2(a) are secondary line
injuries. 129 Secondary line injury occurs vertically between the purchasers from
the discriminating seller as there is a price difference between the two
purchasers who will compete in reselling the commodity. 30
Section 2(a) covers anticompetitive price discriminations that "injure, destroy
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with the customers of [such a person].''
Therefore, the courts have leeway to find anticompetitive effects downstream
from the price discrimination and hold that these effects are violative of section
2(a). The Predatory Dumping Act does not specifically outlaw acts at the second
or third levels of competition. 3 Moreover, the concept of dumping has generally
referred to horizontal injury to domestic competitors of low-priced imported
commodities. 3 3 The only litigation reported concerning the Predatory Dumping
Act has concerned primary line injury. 134 Thus, the Act arguably does not cover
the more attenuated anticompetitive effects that are encompassed under section
2(a). 13 ' It remains to be seen whether future plaintiffs can discover more
flexibility in the statute so as to extend its protection to secondary line injuries
caused by dumping."'
12'For a discussion or the computation of price under the Predatory Dumping Act, see text
accompanying notes 150-53 infra.
"'E.g., Utah Pie. Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 387 U.S. 949 (1967).
12KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 98, at 243 & 245.
"3°E.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). Price discrimination
occurring at the third line is also prohibited. Third line price discrimination occurs between one
purchaser of the discriminating seller and the customers of another purchaser of the discriminating
seller. It may also occur between customers of both purchasers of the discriminating seller. See
KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 98, at 243.
'"115 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
"'It may be important to future interpretations of the statute to note that it prohibits anticom-
petitive activity "in any part of trade or commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970). While less specific than
the language of the Robinson-Patman Act on second line and third line competitive effects, the
language is clearly broad enough to encompass such conduct.
1'See text accompanying notes 1-8, 21-23 supra.
"'Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1935); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In the latter case there is little description
of the allegedly violative conduct, so that a second line or third line injury may in fact be alleged in
addition to the primary line injury.
"'See Applebaum, supra note 28, at 598-99.
"'See note 132 supra.
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C. The Need for an Effective Antitrust Law on Dumping
There are great similarities between the Predatory Dumping Act and section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, as well as some distinct dissimilarities. While a
plenitude of judicial interpretations embellishes the Robinson-Patman Act in an
effort to aid victims of price discriminations that occur domestically, the Preda-
tory Dumping Act represents a largely uncharted area of antitrust law.,37 How-
ever, because of the similarities and distinctive differences in the laws, it is
reasonable to predict that the Predatory Dumping Act can afford the same
protection in international price discrimination cases that is presently offered by
the Robinson-Patman Act in domestic cases.13
Chief Justice Warren Burger, while still circuit court judge, recognized that
treble damages are an effective antitrust weapon. 3 9 Referring to antitrust laws
(among them the Predatory Dumping Act) and suits to redress anticompetitive
activities, he observed:
Punitive damages are particularly apt in such circumstances because they both punish
the wrongdoer, and offer the wronged a greater incentive to bring derelicts to justice, a
process which can subject the victim to considerable expense and trouble. 40
This philosophy is still valid today, especially in light of the sporadic govern-
mental efforts to control dumping by foreign competitors."'I Therefore, courts
called upon to interpret the Predatory Dumping Act in future lawsuits may be
solicitous of plaintiffs and interpret the law in a way that will facilitate enforce-
ment.
IV. Proving a Predatory Dumping Case
A. General Principles
The Predatory Dumping Act parallels the Sherman Act' in that it provides
for criminal as well as civil penalties for violators. This duality in the Sherman
Act has not precluded effective civil enforcement because the courts have
separated the more rigid requirements of criminal lawsuits from civil treble
damage actions.'" 3 Similar treatment of the dual aspects of the Predatory
Dumping Act is appropriate so that proof of a violation of the statute will
" Compare note 72 with text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
"'See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 244, 251 (E.D. Pa.
1975); text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
"'Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
"'Id. (footnote omitted).
"'Marks, supra note 2, at 583-84.
'Sherman Act, Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
4 
4 AREEDA, supra note 123, at 53. But see Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.
1935); text accompanying notes 38-47 supra.
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correspond to civil actions regarding burden of proof, evidentiary presumptions
and proximate causation.' 4 4
Despite the implication by one authority that the Predatory Dumping Act was
not enacted to fulfill antitrust objectives, 14 the law has been treated as an
antitrust law in those few cases which have given it passing attention.146
Therefore, the guiding principle in resolving ambiguities in the statute should
be creative interpretations which will effectuate the goals of the Predatory
Dumping Act. 47 The Supreme Court's approach to the Sherman Act should set
the tone for attempts to decipher the Predatory Dumping Act:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Charta of
free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms."'
B. Behavior
The Predatory Dumping Act must be carefully dissected to determine what
behavior is prohibited. The behavioral elements can be listed in the following
manner:
1. Common and systematic importation and sale of articles into the United
States; 149
2. the sale of the articles at a price substantially less than the actual market
value or wholesale price of the article; '°
1"See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 275-96 (1975).
14ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 658 n.22. This source points out that
one of the reasons why the 1916 Act took the form of an unfair competition law was because the
Democratic, free-trade Congress felt that a dumping duty provision might well compromise its
antiprotectionist position. Id.
While this statement could lead one to believe that the Predatory Dumping Act was not designed to
fulfill antitrust objectives, the passage of the Antidumping Act of 1921, which might properly be
labelled a "protectionist" measure, is an indication that the predatory dumping law was passed to
control anticompetitive practices via antitrust enforcement. The Antidumping Act of 1921, on the
other hand, was clearly designed to impose tariff restrictions which would stifle dumping practices.
See generally Applebaum, supra note 28, at 595-98.
"'See United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600, 609 (1940); Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 n.16
(D.C. Cir. 1958); Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2d 666, 669-70 (2d Cir. 1935); Hutchinson v.
Barry, 50 F. Supp. 292, 297-98 (D. Mass. 1943); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44
F. Supp. 97, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). See also Sigfred v. Pan American World Airways, 230 F.2d 13,
28 n.9 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Local 807 of Int'l Brotherhood, etc., 118 F.2d 684, 688 n.1
(2d Cir. 1941).
"'See text accompanying notes 21-29 supra concerning the reasons for enacting the Predatory
Dumping Act.
"'United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). However, the Department of Justice
has not been enthusiastic in supporting antidumping legislation in all circumstances. Apparently its
reasoning is that some low priced imports aid effective competition in markets with imported and
domestic goods. See Applebaum, supra note 28, at 602.
14See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 124-27 supra.
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a. the time the price is computed is when it is exported to the United States;
b. the place where the foreign price is computed is-
i. at the principal market of the country where it was produced; or
ii. at other foreign countries where it is commonly exported;
c. once the price is ascertained the following costs are added-
i. freight; and
ii. duty; and
iii. other charges and expenses necessarily incident to the importation
and sale of the article in the United States.
The evidence needed to prove these elements of behavior must be made
available from the enterprises involved in the litigation. As Judge Higginbotham
noted in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., "I all
that is necessary are the everyday business figures detailing the exportation of
the articles, the prices of the articles, and the costs incurred in bringing the
articles to the United States and selling them here. 15 Plaintiffs are aided in the
discovery process because the burden is on the defendants to make such figures
available. Defendants may even be required to compute the data if it has not
been previously calculated."'
While the calculations outlined above may be complicated, they should not be
regarded as so esoteric that they fall outside the realm of the regular course of
business in international trade. I"' The proof necessary to establish a violation of
the Act is to be kept within reasonable limitations. s Although the evidence on
illegal behavior may appear to be impossible to establish at first glance, the Act
does not require the parties to "square the circle."1 16
C. Intent
The requisite intent to prove successfully a violation of the Predatory
Dumping Act is stated in a final rather entangled clause in the first paragraph
' '402 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
13
"Id. at 260.
'Id. "The Act requires that defendants make comparatively few computations on the basis of
data that is readily available to them." Id. Cf Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 148
F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945) (defendant's burden under section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act).
111402 F. Supp. at 260 n.9.
1'5Cf. ABA REPORT, supra note 14, at 661 n.33. Legislative proposals outlined in the Report
suggest that Treasury Department and Tariff Commission determinations under the Antidumping
Act of 1921 should constitute prima facie evidence of sales at a dumping price and of injury. This
proposal would substantially lighten the plaintiffs burden of proof in predatory dumping litigation.
See H.R. 328, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1973); S. 323, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1973).
Perhaps future proposals will give plaintiffs in predatory dumping cases a presumption of injury
because of defendant's illegal acts when evidence is presented that defendant has violated the 1921
Act. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 160-71 (1975).
" Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 251, 260 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
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of the statute. 57 When untangled the Act seems to prohibit conduct undertaken
with any one of five different motives. The statute proscribes acts done with the
intent of:
1. destroying an industry in the United States; or
2. injuring an industry in the United States; or
3. preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States; or
4. restraining any part of trade and commerce in the dumped articles in the United
States; or
5. monopolizing any part of trade and commerce in the dumped articles in the United
States. "I
The complex language regarding intent in the Act has led some
commentators to conclude that it is an insurmountable obstacle to successful
enforcement" 9 or at least makes the law extremely difficult to enforce. ,60 These
fears have been partially laid to rest by the district court opinion in Zenith Radio
Corp. 161
In that case it was decided that the intent requirement of section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act 62 was "virtually the same as the predatory intent
requirement" of the Predatory Dumping Act. 63 The court looked to United
States v. National Dairy Products Corp. 164 in arriving at its conclusion. There
the Supreme Court focused on the predatory intent requirement of section 3 of
the Robinson-Patman Act in ruling the statute not unconstitutionally vague.' 65
The Court's analysis sheds light upon the Predatory Dumping Act's intent
requirement.
First, Justice Clark, who wrote the majority opinion, ruled that the requisite
intent was more than the mere intentional achievement of a result.' 66 He then
'"See text accompanying note 32 supra.
'5.15 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
"'Prosterman, supra note 56, at 316 n.4; Marks, supra note 2, at 581.
" Applebaum, supra note 28, at 591; ABA REPoRT, supra note 14, at 661.
161402 F. Supp. 260-62.
-215 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). The statute provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies,
or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within
the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession
or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or dis-
count from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
"11402 F. Supp. at 260.
164372 U.S. 29 (1962).
'01d. at 35.
"'Id. cf, Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-07 (1945).
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went on to explain the statutory language which is analogous to the dumping
law: '67
The Act here . . . prohibit[s] sales at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of
destroying competition, [and] list[s] as elements of the illegal conduct not only the
intent to achieve a result-destruction of competition-but also the act-selling at
unreasonably low prices-done in furtherance of that design or purpose."'8
With this statutory construction the Court concluded that the "separate, though
related, statutory elements of prohibited activity come to focus on one course of
conduct." 169
An application of National Dairy Products to the Predatory Dumping Act
clarifies how the intent language in the Act is to be interpreted. The illegal
intent is intent to achieve any of the five proscribed results listed above 170 by
means of the act of selling the article in the United States at a discriminatory
price. 171
The proof offered in Robinson-Patman civil treble damage actions aids in
determining the type of evidence that can be presented to establish specific
intent in Predatory Dumping Act civil suits. 7 ' The Supreme Court has
identified evidence that establishes predatory intent: (1) persistent unprofitable
sales below cost; (2) radical price cuts; (3) drastically declining price structure;
and (4) surrounding economic circumstances.' 73 In a predatory dumping
lawsuit, it would seem that evidence of defendant's behavior may establish the
requisite specific intent to violate the Act."'
Such a result is consistent with the interpretation of other antitrust law's
intent requirements. 7 Just as "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of
what he is doing," '76 so does no foreign enterprise dump discriminatory priced
articles in the United States without being fully aware of the results of its
actions.
"'Compare note 162 with text accompanying note 32 supra.
'1372 U.S. at 35 (emphasis added).
"69Id.
"'°See text accompanying note 158 supra.
"'See text accompanying notes 149-56 supra.
'Because the Robinson-Patman Act has no specific intent requirement, proof of predatory
intent is used as circumstantial evidence of the illegal result prohibited by the Act. Under the
Predatory Dumping Act, the evidence of predatory intent is essential to a finding of illegality.
"'Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696-97 n.12, 703-04 n.15 (1967).
"'Cf. Atlas Bldg. Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960). See also Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
"'Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread, 348 U.S. 115, 117 (1954); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100, 105-06 (1948).
"'United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Conclusion
The reappearance of the Predatory Dumping Act in modern antitrust law
should herald a new era of effective enforcement by private parties injured from
the pernicious effects of dumping. Because the law is largely uninterpreted, the
potential of the statute lies with the courts that are called upon to interpret it.
There are adequate legal bases in the language of the Act itself and the
analogous rulings under the Robinson-Patman Act to interpret the law in a
fashion which will promote effective enforcement against those who unfairly
compete by dumping. Therefore, the Predatory Dumping Act, which assures
fair competition between firms in the United States and their foreign
competitors, should become an important part of the antitrust laws.
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